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Volunteer Protection under Title VII:
Is Remuneration Required?
Keiko Roset
INTRODUCTION
Volunteering is a respected and common activity in the
United States. A recent survey by the US Department of Labor
revealed that an estimated 62.6 million Americans volunteer,
spending a median of 50 hours a year supporting causes and
institutions that matter to them. 1 Some citizens volunteer to
fulfill school requirements, 2 and others volunteer to develop
skills and contacts for future employment. 3 In addition to the
volunteers, the organizations that retain volunteers benefit from
the relationship. Countless nonprofits and government entities
rely heavily on volunteers, who often work alongside salaried
employees and do similar work.4 Volunteers are particularly
BA 2009, Brown University; JD Candidate 2015, The University of Chicago Law
School.
1 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Volunteering in the United States, 2013 (Feb 25,
2013), online at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/volun.nr0.htm (visited Oct 18, 2014)
(referring to persons twenty-five years and over, during the period between September
2012 and September 2013).
2 See, for example, District of Columbia Public Schools, Community Service
Guidelines, online at http://www.deps.de.gov/DCPS/College+and+Careers/High+School+
Planning/Graduation+Requirements/Community+Service+ Guidelines (visited Oct 18,
2014); Centenary College, Community Service Requirements, online at http://www
.centenarycollege.edu/cms/en/student-activities/community-service/service-requirements
(visited Oct 18, 2014); Harvard Law School, Pro Bono Requirement (Office of Clinical and
Pro Bono Programs May 7, 2014), online at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
academics/clinical /pro-bono/index.html (visited Oct 18, 2014).
See generally Christopher Spera, et al, Volunteering as a Pathway to
Employment: Does Volunteering Increase Odds of Finding a Job for the Out of Work?
(Corporation for National & Community Service June 2013), online at
http://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default /files/upload/employment research report.pd
f (visited Oct 18, 2014) ("[Volunteering [is] associated with a 27% higher odds of
employment.").
4 See, for example, American Red Cross, Ways to Volunteer, online at
http://www.redeross.org/support/volunteer (visited Oct 18, 2013) ("Volunteers constitute
94% of the total workforce to carry out our humanitarian work."); Chicago Public
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important during periods of economic instability, as
organizations become unable to pay for new workers.5
Additionally, the US government explicitly sponsors
volunteerism. Congress passed the Edward M. Kennedy Service
America Act6 in 2009 to "encourage citizens of the United States,
regardless of age, income, geographic location, or disability, to
engage in full-time or part-time national service."7 The
Corporation for National & Community Service, a federal
agency, fulfills its primary purpose to support "the American
culture of citizenship, service and responsibility" by providing
information on volunteer opportunities and publishing reports
on the benefits of volunteering.8 Several presidents throughout
history have encouraged Americans to volunteer.9 For example,
after the 2012 presidential election, President Obama attributed
his success in large part to the volunteers who worked on his
campaign. 10 More recently in October 2013, he publicly thanked
Schools, Volunteer Opportunities (Nov 18, 2013), online at http: //www.cps.edu/Pages
/directory-volunteeropportunities.aspx (visited Oct 18, 2013) ("With approximately
417,000 students in more than 600 schools, there are many ways you can volunteer to
help the Chicago Public Schools."); Volunteer.gov, Find a Volunteer Opportunity, online
at http: //volunteer.gov (visited Oct 18, 2014) (providing a database of volunteer
opportunities with government agencies).
See Susan Kinzie, Number of volunteers has grown despite recession, study says
(Wash Post June 15, 2010), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/15/AR2010061501449.html (visited Oct 18, 2014) ("Some
small nonprofits had to rely on volunteers more than ever when the economy tanked and
they could no longer afford as many paid staff members.").
6 Pub L No 11-13, 123 Stat 1460 (2009), codified at 42 USC § 12501 et seq.
7 42 USC § 12501(b)(4).
8 Corporation for National & Community Service, Volunteering and Civic Life in
America 2012: Key findings on the volunteer participation and civic health of the nation
(Dec 2012), online at http://www.volunteeringinamerica. gov/assets/resources/
FactSheetFinal.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014) ("We invite even more Americans to join us in
making a difference.").
9 See Tara Kpere-Daibo, Note, Unpaid and Unprotected: Protecting Our Nation's
Volunteers Through Title VII, 32 U Ark Little Rock L Rev 135, 135-36 (2009) ("President
Richard Nixon established National Volunteer Week in 1974 to celebrate volunteering.
In 1987, President Ronald Reagan created the President's Volunteer Award. President
George H.W. Bush established the Points of Light Foundation, a private foundation
committed to furthering volunteer efforts. He also established a White House office to
promote volunteerism. In the 1990s, President Bill Clinton was instrumental in the
creation of the Corporation for National Service, an entity that would oversee
AmeriCorps and other volunteer programs.") (citations omitted).
10 See Transcript of President Obama's Election Night Speech (NY Times Nov 7,
2012), online at http: //www.nytimes.com/20 12/11/07/us/politics/transcript-of-president-
obamas-election-night-speech.html (visited Oct 18, 2014) ("[Thank you to] the best
campaign team and volunteers in the history of politics. . . .").
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furloughed federal employees for volunteering for charities and
nonprofits during the government shutdown."
Though volunteerism is celebrated and encouraged in this
country, volunteers are not adequately protected from
discrimination at their place of service. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196412 was enacted to comprehensively combat
discrimination in the workplace, 13 yet it does not apply explicitly
to volunteers. While Title VII prevents employers from
discriminating against employees based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, the statutory language of Title VII does
not provide a complete definition of "employee."14 As a result,
the line dividing those volunteers who are entitled to Title VII
protection and those who are not shielded from employment
discrimination is unclear.
Individuals working as volunteers generally do not receive
Title VII protection, but, under certain circumstances,
volunteers have been granted Title VII "employee" status. 15 The
federal circuit courts are split regarding the standard used when
determining whether Title VII protection extends to a plaintiff
volunteer. 16 A minority of circuits use the common law agency
test, looking at various factors to determine whether the
plaintiff volunteer's relationship with the defendant
organization resembles an employee -employer relationship.1 7
The majority of circuits use a threshold-remuneration test,
requiring that the plaintiff volunteer first prove that he or she
received remuneration from the defendant organization before
engaging in the common law agency analysis.1 8
" Nathaniel Lubin, President Obama Visits Martha's Table to Thank Furloughed
Workers (The White House Blog Oct 15, 2013), online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/10/15/president-obama-visits-martha-s-table-
thank-furloughed-workers (visited Oct 18, 2014).
12 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (1964), codified at 42 USC § 2000a et seq.
s See Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities: The
Case for the Unpaid Intern, 66 Fordham L Rev 2613, 2622-23 (1998).
14 See 42 USC §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-2(a) (defining an employee as "an individual
employed by an employer").
" See, for example, Juino u Livingston Parish Fire District No 5, 717 F3d 431, 439
(5th Cir 2013).
16 See id at 435.
" See, for example, Bryson u Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc, 656 F3d
348, 354 (6th Cir 2011).
1s See, for example, O'Connor u Davis, 126 F3d 112, 115-16 (2d Cir 1997).
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This Comment discusses the test that should be used by
courts to determine whether a volunteer is an "employee" under
Title VII. Part I provides background information by
summarizing Title VII and related Supreme Court cases. Part II
describes the circuit split and the reasoning used by the majority
and minority circuits. Part III proposes that the circuit split be
resolved in favor of the minority circuits' common law agency
test, rather than the majority circuits' threshold-remuneration
test. This Comment argues that the majority circuits' threshold-
remuneration test is inappropriate because it conflicts with the
Restatement of Agency, which the Supreme Court has used to
shape its analysis in relevant cases involving Title VII and other
areas of employment law. Part IV concludes that the minority
circuits' common law agency test and the corresponding
Restatement of Agency mean that volunteers do not need to be
closed off from Title VII protection by a remuneration
requirement.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII
Volunteers who have experienced discrimination at their
place of service have often turned to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,19 which may be "the most important civil rights
statute that Congress has enacted in the past fifty years."20 The
Act was passed "in response to mounting popular demand to
extend constitutional equality protections to African
Americans." 21 Congress enacted Title VII to end discrimination
in the workplace and to declare "the right of persons to be free
from [ ] discrimination." 22
Under Title VII, it is illegal "for an employer ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
19 See, for example, Bryson, 656 F3d at 349-50.
20 Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years
Later, 34 Conn L Rev 981, 1022 (2002).
21 Suzanne Sangree, Title VHI Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 Rutgers L Rev 461, 481
(1995).
22 Civil Rights Act of 1964, HR Rep No 914, 88th Cong, 2d Sess 2401 (1964),
reprinted in 1964 USCCAN 2391.
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because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 2 3 Courts have held that the phrase "any individual"
refers to employees. 24 It is also unlawful for an employer "to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by [Title VII], or . . . participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title
VII]." 25 Title VII "prohibits discrimination with respect to
employment decisions that have direct economic consequences,
such as termination, demotion, and pay cuts," and it also
"reaches the creation or perpetuation of a discriminatory work
environment." 2 6
Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year."2 7 The statute's
definition of the term "employee" is "an individual employed by
an employer." 2 8 Many other employment laws use the same
definition for "employee," including the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 2 9 the Family and Medical Leave Act, 30 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 32 and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act. 33
23 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
24 See, for example, Llampallas u Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc, 163 F3d 1236, 1242 (11th
Cir 1998) ("[Title VII] does not define 'any individual,' and although we could read the
term literally, we have held that only those plaintiffs who are 'employees' may bring a
Title VII suit."); Serapion u Martinez, 119 F3d 982, 985 (1st Cir 1997) ("Although the
language [of Title VII] speaks of 'any individual,' courts long ago concluded that Title VII
is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.").
2' 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
26 Vance v Ball State University, 133 S Ct 2434, 2440-41 (2013) (agreeing with
lower courts that "Title VII prohibits the creation of a hostile work environment").
27 42 USC § 2000e(b).
28 42 USC § 2000e(f).
29 Pub L No 75-718, 52 Stat 1060 (1938), codified at 29 USC § 203(e)(1).
so Pub L No 103-3, 107 Stat 6 (1993), codified at 29 USC § 2611(3).
" Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602 (1967), codified at 42 USC § 2000e(f).
32 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 2111(4).
" Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829 (1974), codified at 29 USC § 1002(6).
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B. Relevant Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has not addressed how Title VII should
apply to volunteers, but three Supreme Court cases have served
as starting points for the circuit courts' reasoning in
employment discrimination cases involving volunteers. While
the following Supreme Court cases do not consider Title VII,
they examine the employee-employer relationship under
statutes that, like Title VII, are unclear regarding the meaning
of the term "employee."
1. Reid: the congressional intent associated with the term
"employee" in statutes.
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid,34 the
Supreme Court decided whether a nonprofit organization
commissioned an artist for a sculpture constituting a "work
made for hire" 35 under the Copyright Act of 1976.36 The
Copyright Act defines a "work made for hire" as "work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment," but
the Act does not define the term "employee." 37
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a general
principle: "[W]hen Congress has used the term 'employee'
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended
to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine." 38 This conclusion
followed from the fact that "where Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under the common law, a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms." 39
The Supreme Court in Reid continued, "In past cases of
statutory interpretation, when we have concluded that Congress
intended terms such as 'employee,' 'employer,' and 'scope of
34 490 US 730 (1989).
" See Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid, 490 US 730, 732 (1989).
1 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976), codified at 17 USC § 101.
1 See 17 USC § 101. See also Reid, 490 US at 738-39 (1989).
"' Reid, 490 US at 739-40 (1989), citing Kelley v Southern Pacific Co, 419 US 318,
322-323 (1974); Baker u Texas and Pacific Railway Co, 359 US 227, 228 (1959);
Robinson u Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co, 237 US 84, 94 (1915).
39 Reid, 490 US at 739 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
610 [ 2014
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employment' to be understood in light of agency law, we have
relied on the general common law of agency, rather than on the
law of any particular State, to give meaning to these terms." 40
One reason to rely on the common law was the fact that "federal
statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide
application." 4 1 The Court then summarized the common law
agency test:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee
under the general common law of agency, we consider the
hiring party's right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished. Among the other
factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of
the work; the duration of the relationship between the
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;
the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring
and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring
party is in business; the provision of employee benefits;
and the tax treatment of the hired party. 42
These factors were based on the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, and the Supreme Court explained that "[n]o one of these
factors is determinative." 4 3
The Court concluded from an analysis of the common law
agency factors that the sculptor was not an employee but an
independent contractor.44 Though the sculptor created a
sculpture that met the specifications and deadlines of the
nonprofit organization, he worked in his own studio, supplied
his own tools, was retained for less than two months, and had
total discretion in all other aspects of his work.45 The cumulative
40 Id at 740-41, citing Kelley, 419 US at 332; Ward v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co, 362 US 396, 400 (1960); Baker, 359 US at 228.
41 Reid, 490 US at 740, quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield,
490 US 30, 43 (1989).
42 Reid, 490 US at 751-52 (citations omitted).
43 Id at 752.
44 Id.
41 Id at 752-53.
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approach based on the Restatement (Second) of Agency allowed
the Court to examine all relevant aspects to the existence of
"employee" status.
2. Darden: the application of common law principles to a
circular definition.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v Darden,4 6 the
Supreme Court applied the common law agency test laid out in
Reid to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197447
(ERISA).4 8 Like Title VII, ERISA's definition of "employee" is
"any individual employed by an employer."4 9 The Court started
its analysis of the term by recognizing that this definition "is
completely circular and explains nothing."50
The Supreme Court did not find "any provision [in ERISA]
either giving specific guidance on the term's meaning or
suggesting that construing it to incorporate traditional agency
law principles would thwart the congressional design or lead to
absurd results."5 1 Therefore, the Court adopted the common law
agency test for determining who qualifies as an "employee"
under ERISA. 52 It also noted that "[s]ince the common-law test
contains no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be
applied to find the answer, all of the incidents of the relationship
must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being
decisive." 53
The Supreme Court in Darden rejected the argument that
"employee" should instead be construed "in the light of the
mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained,"54 which was
a broader standard used in National Labor Relations Board v
Hearst Publications, Inc55 and United States v Silk.56 Hearst and
Silk were earlier Supreme Court cases that interpreted
46 503 US 318 (1992).
47 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829 (1974), codified at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
48 Darden, 503 US at 319, 323-24.
49 29 USC § 1002(6). See also Darden, 503 US at 323.
'o Darden, 503 US at 323.
51 Id.
52 Id.
" Id at 324 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
14 Darden, 503 US at 324, quoting United States u Silk, 331 US 704, 713 (1947).
322 US 111, 124 (1944).
331 US 704, 713 (1947).
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"employee" for the purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act 5 7 and the Social Security Act,5 8 respectively.59 The Court in
Darden noted that after the Hearst and Silk opinions, Congress
amended the statutes at issue "to demonstrate that the usual
common-law principles were the keys to meaning," providing
guidance for future statutory construction.60
The Court then remanded the case so that the Court of
Appeals could determine whether Darden, an insurance
salesman, was an employee of Nationwide Mutual Insurance.61
The Court directed that this analysis be conducted under
"traditional agency law principles," 62 applying the cumulative
approach to a statute with the same "employee" definition as
Title VII.
3. Clackamas: an emphasis on the existence of control.
The most recent Supreme Court case relevant to the circuit
split is Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v Wells.63 This
case dealt with an alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 199064 (ADA), which has the same circular
definition of "employee" as ERISA and Title VII.65 The issue in
the case was whether the "employee" definition included
physicians engaged as shareholders and directors of a medical
clinic. 66 The Court relied on Reid and Darden since they are
"cases construing similar language [that] give us guidance on
how best to fill the gap in the statutory text."67 It then similarly
concluded that Congress intended for "employee" and "employer"
to describe the master-servant relationship under the common
law agency test.68
1 29 USC § 151 et seq (defining "employee" to mean "any employee").
"' 42 USC § 301 et seq (defining "employee" to "include," among other, unspecified
occupations, "an officer of a corporation").
'9 See Darden, 503 US at 323.
£0 Id at 324-25.
61 Id at 328.
62 Id.
6 538 US 440 (2003).
64 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
See 42 USC § 12111(4) (defining "employee" as "an individual employed by an
employer").
66 Clackamas, 538 US at 442.
67 Id at 444.
£8 Id at 445.
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The Clackamas Court elaborated on the common law
doctrine by stating that "the relevant factors defining the
master-servant relationship focus on the master's control over
the servant." 69 The Court referred to the Restatement (Second)
of Agency, which defines "servant" as a person whose work is
"controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master."70
The Restatement also repeats the control element in other
sections.71 It states that a distinguishing factor between
servants and independent contractors is the extent of control
that one exercises over the work of the other. 72
The Court supported its emphasis on the extent of control
with guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), "the agency that has special enforcement
responsibilities under the ADA and other federal statutes
containing similar threshold issues for determining coverage ."7
The EEOC factors relevant to whether a shareholder-director is
an "employee" are:
o Whether the organization can hire or fire the
individual or set the rules and regulations of the
individual's work
o Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization
supervises the individual's work
o Whether the individual reports to someone higher in
the organization
o Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is
able to influence the organization
o Whether the parties intended that the individual be
an employee, as expressed in written agreements or
contracts, and
o Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses,
and liabilities of the organization.74
69 Id at 448.
7o Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(2) (1957). See also Clackamas, 538 US at
442.
71 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(1) (1957) ("A servant is a person
employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the
physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or
right to control.").
72 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(a) (1957). See also Clackamas, 538
US at 448.
7 Clackamas, 538 US at 448.
74 EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009. See also Clackamas, 538 US at 449-50.
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The Court further added that the "mere fact that a person
has a particular title . . . should not necessarily be used to
determine whether he or she is an employee or a proprietor" and
reiterated that the "employee" analysis depends on "all of the
incidents of the relationship with no one factor being decisive." 75
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
The circuit courts have referred to Reid, Darden, and
Clackamas when faced with the question of how volunteers
should be analyzed for Title VII purposes. However, the circuits
have applied the Supreme Court cases differently and are split
on whether remuneration is necessary in determining whether a
volunteer falls under the Title VII "employee" category. The
majority circuits use a threshold-remuneration test, which
requires that the plaintiff volunteer receive remuneration from
the defendant organization before engaging in the common law
agency analysis. The minority circuits use the common law
agency test, which asks whether the plaintiff volunteer's
relationship with the defendant organization resembles an
employee -employer relationship.
A. Majority Circuits
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have adopted a standard for Title VII volunteer cases
known as the threshold-remuneration test. 76 The test requires a
volunteer to show that he or she received remuneration, such as
salary or wages, before the court can proceed to analyze the
employment relationship under the common law agency test.77
7 Clackamas, 538 US at 450-51 (citations omitted).
7 See O'Connor, 126 F3d at 116 ("We believe that the preliminary question of
remuneration is dispositive in this case."); Haavistola v Community Fire Company of
Rising Sun, Inc, 6 F3d 211, 220 (4th Cir 1993); Juino, 717 F3d at 439; Graves v Women's
Professional Rodeo Association, Inc, 907 F2d 71, 74 (8th Cir 1990); McGuinness v
University of New Mexico School of Medicine, 170 F3d 974, 979 (10th Cir 1998);
Llampallas, 163 F3d at 1243.
7 See Juino, 717 F3d at 435.
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1. The Eighth Circuit in Graves: the ordinary usage of
"employee."
The first major case that detailed the requirements for an
employer-employee relationship under Title VII was Graves v
Women's Professional Rodeo Association, Inc,78 which was
decided shortly after Reid. Lance Graves brought a suit against
the Women's Professional Rodeo Association (WPRA) for
denying him membership on the basis of his gender in violation
of Title VII.79 Although the WPRA exercised a degree of control
over its members via membership rules, it was primarily a
voluntary organization that provided its members with the
opportunity to compete for prize money.80
The Eighth Circuit found that the relationship between the
WPRA and its members was not one of "employment" based on
the ordinary usage of the term.81 The court explained that Title
VII failed to "set out any meaning for 'employer' and 'employee'
distinct from those implied by ordinary usage" and believed that
the "definitions seem to leave no other route." 82 The court also
relied on the legislative history of Title VII, which it said
"explicitly provides that the dictionary definition should govern
the interpretation of 'employer' under Title VII."83
The Eighth Circuit relied on the following dictionary
definitions: "employee" meaning "one employed by another ...
usually for wages," "employer" as "one that employs something
or somebody," and "employ" as "to provide with a job that pays
wages or a salary or with a means of earning a living."8 4 Based
on these definitions, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "[c]entral
to the meaning of these words is the idea of compensation in
exchange for services: an employer is someone who pays, directly
or indirectly, wages or a salary or other compensation to the
78 907 F2d 71 (8th Cir 1990).
79 Graves, 907 F2d at 71.
80 Id at 72.
81 Id at 72-73.
82 Id at 73.
"' Graves, 907 F2d at 73, citing 110 Cong Rec 7216 (Apr 8, 1964) (response of the
subcommittee to Senator Dirksen's memorandum).
84 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 743 (unabridged) (Merriam-
Webster 1981). See also Graves, 907 F2d at 73.
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person who provides services-that person being the
employee."85
Consequently, the court viewed compensation as "an
essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship." 86 Therefore, since members of the WPRA receive
no compensation from the WPRA, there was no employer-
employee relationship.87 The court affirmed summary judgment
for the WPRA and noted that courts turn to common-law
principles to analyze the character of an economic relationship
"only in situations that plausibly approximate an employment
relationship."8 8
2. The Second Circuit in O'Connor: a "hiring" prerequisite
to the existence of an employment relationship.
O'Connor v Davis8 9 is another early case that introduced a
remuneration threshold for Title VII protections in the volunteer
context. As a component of her major at Marymount College,
Bridget O'Connor was required to intern at one of several
Marymount-approved organizations.90 She accepted an unpaid
internship at Rockland Hospital and received federal work-study
funds through Marymount. 91 Dr. James Davis, a psychiatrist at
the hospital, began making inappropriate sexual remarks to
O'Connor. 92 She left the hospital to complete her internship
elsewhere and brought sexual harassment claims against Davis
pursuant to Title VII.93
Noting that the definition of "employee" in Title VII is
circular, the Second Circuit needed to determine whether
O'Connor's position fit within "the conventional master-servant
relationship as understood by the common-law agency
doctrine."94 The court quoted the Reid common law agency
"' Graves, 907 F2d at 73.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id at 74 ("[N]o compensation is made, only prize money won-and that is not
supplied by the alleged employer nor does the recipient necessarily come from the
postulated class of employees."). Id at 73.
89 126 F3d 112 (2d Cir 1997).
90 O'Connor, 126 F3d at 113.
91 Id.
92 Id at 113-14.
93 Id at 114.
94 O'Connor, 126 F3d at 115, citing Darden, 503 US at 322-23.
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factors95 but observed that the "conventional master-servant
relationship" had previously been examined in cases
determining whether a party was an employee or independent
contractor.96 It then reasoned that since "the common feature
shared by both the employee and the independent contractor is
that they are 'hired parties,' . . . a prerequisite to considering
whether an individual is one or the other under common-law
agency principles is that the individual have been hired in the
first instance."97 To support this idea, the Second Circuit relied
on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Graves.98
The Second Circuit concluded:
Where no financial benefit is obtained by the purported
employee from the employer, no plausible employment
relationship of any sort can be said to exist because
although compensation by the putative employer to the
putative employee in exchange for his services is not a
sufficient condition, it is an essential condition to the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.9
Therefore, the Second Circuit determined that the question
of remuneration was dispositive.100
Since it was uncontested that O'Connor did not receive
salary, wages, or any other form of "economic remuneration"
from the hospital, the court rejected O'Connor's sexual
harassment claim. 101 It also rejected O'Connor's argument that
95 O'Connor, 126 F3d at 115, citing Reid, 490 US at 751-52.
96 Id, citing Reid, 490 US at 739-40 (considering the Copyright Act of 1976);
Darden, 503 US at 322-23 (considering ERISA); Alford v United States, 116 F3d 334,
337-38 (8th Cir 1997) (considering 26 USC § 62(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code);
Cilecek u Inova Health System Services, 115 F3d 256, 260 (4th Cir 1997) (considering
Title VII); Sharkey v Ultramar Energy Ltd, 70 F3d 226, 232 (2d Cir 1995) (considering
ERISA).
97 O'Connor, 126 F3d at 115 (internal citations omitted).
98 Id at 115-16.
99 Id (internal quotations omitted) (noting that this conclusion is consistent with
Tadros u Coleman, 898 F2d 10, 11 (2d Cir 1990), in which the court upheld the dismissal
of Title VII claims of a plaintiff volunteer at Cornell Medical College who received no
salary, health benefits, or retirement benefits on the ground that the plaintiff was not an
employee under Title VII).
100 O'Connor, 126 F3d at 116.
101 Id.
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she was compensated with federal work-study funding, as those
payments were made by her college, not the hospital. 102
3. Other cases in the majority circuits that developed the
standard.
The other circuits within the majority have relied on Graves
and O'Connor to require that a volunteer show remuneration
before engaging in the common law agency analysis described in
Reid, Darden, and Clackamas. 103 They have also added
additional reasoning and further developed the threshold
remuneration test.
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit in Juino v Livingston Parish
Fire District No. 5104 elaborated on O'Connor's interpretation of
Darden and Reid. The court highlighted the fact that Darden
and Reid determined only whether a party was an employee or
an independent contractor, not an employee or a volunteer.1 0 5 It
then noted that the threshold-remuneration test is "uniquely
suited to assessing a plausible employment relationship within
the volunteer context."106 This is because the promise or delivery
of remuneration indicates whether volunteers have been "hired,"
putting them in the same category as employees and
independent contractors. 107 Only at this point can a court
appropriately apply the analysis from Darden and Reid.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Haavistola v Community
Fire Company of Rising Sun, Inc10 8 serves as a response to the
Clackamas emphasis on control to signify an employment
relationship. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the
"common-law standard traditionally used when deciding
whether an individual can claim employee status emphasizes
102 Id at 116 n 2. See also Pastor u Partnership for Children's Rights, 2012 WL
4503415, *2 (EDNY Sept 28, 2012) (holding that school credit and a stipend do not
satisfy the threshold remuneration test because they were conferred by the interns'
educational institutions).
'os See, for example, Juino, 717 F3d at 435; Jacob-Mua u Veneman, 289 F3d 517, 521
(8th Cir 2002); Daggitt u United Food and Commercial Workers International Union,
Local 304, 245 F3d 981, 987 (8th Cir 2001); McGuinness, 170 F3d at 979 (10th Cir 1998).
104 717 F3d 431 (5th Cir 2013).
10 See Juino, 717 F3d at 435.
106 Id at 439.
107 See id.
10 6 F3d 211 (4th Cir 1993).
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the importance of the employer's control over the individual."109
However, "[c]ontrol loses some of its significance ... in those
situations in which compensation is not evident." 110
In Llampallas v Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc,111 the Eleventh
Circuit extended the required showing of remuneration to
individuals not labeled "volunteers." It applied the threshold
remuneration test to an "officer-director" who was not paid
because "Congress did not intend Title VII to protect mere titles
or labels." 112 The court believed that "an individual who sues
only to maintain a purely gratuitous working relationship does
so without the protection of that statute." 1 13
The Eighth Circuit in Daggitt v United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 304A114 further
clarified that "[w]ithout compensation, no combination of other
factors will suffice to establish the [employer-employee]
relationship."1 1 5 The implication is that two individuals could
perform the exact same work for an employer, but only the one
who receives remuneration enjoys an employer-employee
relationship.
While remuneration is required, a showing of a salary or
wages is not. Other forms of direct financial benefit are
sufficient to satisfy the threshold-remuneration test. For
example, in Daggitt, the cumulative monetary benefits of union
dues, lost-time pay, and 401(k) plan contributions amounted to
compensation.116 Non-economic benefits, however, are not
considered compensation. An obvious example is Jacob-Mua v
Veneman, 117 in which research obtained through the volunteer's
work did not constitute compensation, even though it supported
the volunteer's related dissertation. 118 Additionally, minimal
compensation does not appear to meet the threshold
109 Haavistola, 6 F3d at 219-20.
110 Id at 220.
. 163 F3d 1236 (11th Cir 1998).
112 Liampallas, 163 F3d at 1244.
113 Id.
114 245 F3d 981 (8th Cir 2001).
... Daggitt, 245 F3d at 987.
116 Id at 987-88.
117 289 F3d 517 (8th Cir 2002).
11s Jacob-Mua, 289 F3d at 521.
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remuneration test. The Fifth Circuit in Juino held that a
volunteer firefighter's compensation of $78 was insufficient. 119
Some courts within the majority circuits have invited
Congress to alter this analysis. They believe "it is within the
province of Congress . . . to provide a remedy under Title VII for
plaintiffs in [a volunteer] position." 12 0
4. Significant indirect benefits as remuneration.
Within the majority circuits, some courts have held that
"significant indirect benefits" can constitute remuneration. As
the Second Circuit explained in York v Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, 121 employee benefits like health insurance
or vacation are also "indicative of financial benefit." 122 The
significant indirect benefit cases emphasize that the indirect
benefits "must meet a minimum level of significance, or
substantiality, in order to find an employment relationship in
the absence of more traditional compensation." 12 3 Also, the
benefits must "primarily benefit the employee independently of
the employer" and cannot be "merely incidental to the activity
performed" in order to satisfy the threshold remuneration
test. 124
In Haavistola, an early case involving significant indirect
benefits, the Fourth Circuit determined whether a volunteer
119 Juino, 717 F3d at 439-40 (explaining that the plaintiff received $2 per
fire/emergency call in addition to a life insurance policy, a full fighter's uniform and
badge, firefighting and emergency response gear, and firefighting and emergency first-
response training).
120 Id. See also O'Connor, 126 F3d at 119 ("[I]t is for Congress, if it should choose to
do so, and not this court, to provide a remedy under . . . Title VII . . . for plaintiffs in
O'Connor's position.").
12 286 F3d 122 (2d Cir 2002).
122 York, 286 F3d at 126 (internal quotations omitted).
123 Id (internal quotations omitted) (holding that limited tax deductions are not
'sufficiently substantial"). See also Pietras u Board of Fire Commissioners of the
Farmingoille Fire District, 180 F3d 468, 473 (2d Cir 1999) (requiring numerous job-
related benefits); Ferroni u Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Warehousemen Local No. 222, 297
F3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir 2002) (holding that isolated reimbursements for lost time are
"insufficient to establish employment relationships"); Partnership for Children's Rights,
2012 WL 4503415 at *2 (holding that reimbursement for CLE courses and multiple
hours of classes and training are not "substantial job-related benefits that give rise to an
employment relationship).
124 York, 286 F3d at 126 (stating that benefits like clerical support and networking
opportunities are "merely incidental").
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firefighter was an employee covered under Title VII. 12 5 The
volunteer received no direct compensation, but this was not
dispositive because she "did not affiliate with the company
without reward entirely." 12 6 As a firefighter, she received several
benefits, including a state-funded disability pension, survivors'
benefits for dependents, scholarships for dependents, group life
insurance, and tuition reimbursement for emergency medical
and fire service courses. 127 Since "compensation" was not defined
by statute or case law, the Fourth Circuit held that it was in the
hands of the factfinder to conclude "whether the benefits
represent indirect but significant remuneration as Haavistola
contend[ed] or inconsequential incidents of an otherwise
gratuitous relationship as the Fire Company argue [d]." 128
In Pietras v Board of Fire Commissioners of the
Farmingoille Fire District,129 the Second Circuit added that "an
employment relationship within the scope of Title VII can exist
even when the putative employee receives no salary as long as
he or she gets numerous job-related benefits." 130 It held that a
volunteer firefighter was a Title VII "employee" when the
firefighter did not receive a salary or wages but did receive a
retirement pension, life insurance, death benefits, disability
insurance, and limited medical benefits.131
In US v City of New York, 132 the Second Circuit again found
significant indirect benefits when the plaintiffs received food
stamps and cash payments equaling minimum wage for their
work as part of a mandatory welfare work program. 133 The
plaintiffs also received transportation and childcare expenses
and eligibility for workers' compensation. 134 The court supported
121 Haavistola, 6 F3d at 219.
126 Id at 221.
127 Id (listing also the following: bestowal of a state flag to family upon death in the
line of duty, benefits under the Federal Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act when on
duty, coverage under Maryland's Workers Compensation Act, tax exemptions for
unreimbursed travel expenses, ability to purchase a special commemorative registration
plate for private vehicles without additional fees, and access to a method to obtain
certification as a paramedic).
128 Id at 221-22.
129 180 F3d 468 (2d Cir 1999).
1so Pietras, 180 F3d at 473.
.s. See id at 471, 473.
132 359 F3d 83 (2d Cir 2004).
.ss City of New York, 359 F3d at 92.
134 Id.
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its holding by adding that the plaintiffs had to "perform useful
work to receive any of the benefits." 135
B. Minority Circuits
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have not held that
remuneration is an independent antecedent requirement but
view remuneration as only one, non-dispositive factor in
conjunction with the other common law agency test factors. 136
1. The Sixth Circuit in Bryson: consistency with the
Supreme Court's instructions.
In Bryson u Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc, 137
the Sixth Circuit expressly declined to adopt O'Connor's holding
that, to be a "hired party" entitled to the Reid common law
agency analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate a threshold
showing of "significant remuneration." 138 Similar to many other
Title VII volunteer cases, such as Haavistola, Pietras, and
Juino, Bryson involved a volunteer firefighter. 139 Marcia Bryson
alleged that the fire chief sexually harassed and retaliated
against her in violation of Title VII. 140
The Sixth Circuit held that remuneration was not
dispositive because it did "not believe that the term 'hired party'
from Darden and Reid supports an independent antecedent
requirement."14 1 The court remarked that "[t]he Supreme Court
included the term 'hired party' in Darden only in a direct quote
from its decision in Reid, and the Reid Court's use of 'hired
party' was in the context of the 'work for hire' provision from the
Copyright Act." 142 Therefore, the term was case specific and not
applicable in the Title VII context. 143
135 Id.
1s6 See, for example, Bryson u Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc, 656 F3d
348, 354 (6th Cir 2011); Fichman u Media Center, 512 F3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir 2008).
1s7 656 F3d 348 (6th Cir 2011).
"s See Bryson, 656 F3d at 354.
19 See id at 350.
140 Id.
141 Id at 354.
142 Bryson, 656 F3d at 354.
143 Id. But see Clackamas, 583 US at 445 n 5 (describing the Reid factors as the
'common-law test for determining whether a hired party is an employee" and therefore
interpreting the phrase "hired party" to apply to employee-employer relationships
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The court further stated that "[a]lthough the [Supreme]
Court did not define 'hired party' in Reid, it did define 'hiring
party' . . . [as] the party who claims ownership of the copyright
by virtue of the work for hire doctrine."144 The court continued,
"[w]e doubt that the [Supreme] Court would define 'hiring party'
as such while at the same time considering 'hired party' to carry
much more substantive weight in requiring that it be an
individual who received significant remuneration for his
services."14 5
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit in Bryson found that the
Supreme Court's instruction to apply the common law of agency
is not limited to when the individual receives significant
remuneration. Rather, it is applied "when Congress has used the
term 'employee' without defining it."146 The court supported its
conclusion with Darden's instruction that, when evaluating a
particular relationship, "all of the incidents of the relationship
must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being
decisive."14 7 The Bryson court acknowledged that several of the
factors listed in Darden and Reid related to financial matters
but concluded that "no one factor, including remuneration, . . . is
an independent antecedent requirement."1 4 8
2. The Ninth Circuit in Fichman and Waisgerber: different
sources supporting its conclusion that remuneration is
not dispositive.
In Fichman v Media Center, 14 9 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether directors and independent producers of a nonprofit
media company were "employees" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act 150 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. 151 After noting that remuneration was a non-dispositive
factor, the court determined that directors were not "employees"
under the common law agency analysis in Clackamas, which
beyond the Copyright Act).
144 Bryson, 656 F3d at 354, citing Reid, 490 US at 739.
14' Bryson, 656 F3d at 354.
146 Id (emphasis omitted), citing Reid, 490 US at 739-40.
147 Bryson, 656 F3d at 354, citing Darden, 503 US at 324.
148 Bryson, 656 F3d at 354.
149 512 F3d 1157 (9th Cir 2008).
"s 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
... 29 USC § 621 et seq.
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adopted six control-focused factors from the EEOC standard. 152
The court then holistically analyzed the remaining common law
agency factors in light of the directors' relationship with the
employer, ultimately concluding that the directors were not Title
VII "employees." 153
A later Ninth Circuit case, Waisgerber v City of Los
Angeles, 154 similarly held that lack of remuneration was not
dispositive in deciding whether an unpaid volunteer met the
definition of "employee" under Title VII. 155 Interestingly, the
court used the substantial indirect benefits cases from the
majority circuits-City of New York, Pietras, and Haavistola-to
support its reasoning. 156 In those cases, the Waisgerber court
highlighted, the volunteers were considered "employees" even
when they had not received any money in exchange for their
work. 157
C. Circuits Yet to Rule
The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have not yet ruled on
this issue. A district court case in the Third Circuit followed the
majority approach and required a showing of remuneration. 158
District courts in the Seventh Circuit have disagreed on the
proper analysis.159
III. SOLUTION
Since the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this circuit
split, there continues to be inconsistency among circuits
regarding the analysis for Title VII employment discrimination
cases involving volunteers. Currently, it is possible for a plaintiff
152 See Fichman, 512 F3d 1160, citing Clackamas, 583 US at 449-50.
15s See Fichman, 512 F3d at 1160-61.
114 406 Fed Appx 150 (9th Cir 2010).
... See Waisgerber, 406 Fed Appx at 152.
15 Id.
157 Id.
"s See Cimino u Borough of Dunmore, 2005 WL 3488419, *6 (MD Penn Dec 21,
2005) ("Where the plaintiff received no compensation from the defendant, she cannot
plausibly assert she was an employee [under Title VII].").
19 Compare Doe v Lee, 943 F Supp 2d 870, 877 (ND Ill 2013) (holding that a finding
of compensation was required to extend Title VII protections to an unpaid intern), with
Volling u Antioch Rescue Squad, 2012 WL 6021553, *8 (ND Ill Dec 4, 2012) (holding that
the threshold-remuneration test is not consistent with the "Supreme Court's instruction
to evaluate the question using the common-law principles of agency").
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volunteer in a majority circuit to be dismissed at the summary
judgment stage for lacking financial benefits, while a plaintiff
volunteer in a minority circuit may be able to proceed to trial to
litigate the common law agency factors.
Given the fact that "federal statutes are generally intended
to have uniform nationwide application," the circuit split should
be resolved. 160 This Comment argues that the minority circuits'
common law agency test should prevail because it corresponds
with applicable provisions in the Restatement of Agency, which
the Supreme Court used to shape its analysis in the cases
discussed in Part I of this Comment.
A. The Supreme Court's Reliance on the Restatement of
Agency
The Restatement of Agency is a reliable source of authority,
as it was used by the Supreme Court in Reid, Darden, and
Clackamas to support its application of common law principles
in the employment context.
As discussed in Part II, the Court in Reid concluded that
Congress intended terms such as "employee," "employer," and
"scope of employment" to be understood in light of agency law. 161
It then implemented this conclusion by applying the common
law of agency as laid out in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. 162 The Court cited to the factors in the Restatement,
exactly as listed, to determine what was relevant to the
"employee" inquiry. 163
Due to "Reid's presumption that Congress means an agency
law definition for 'employee' unless it clearly indicates
otherwise," Darden continued the reliance on the Restatement's
common law agency doctrine when evaluating an employer-
employee relationship.1 6 4 Nowhere did the Supreme Court state
that the Restatement factors applied narrowly or only to
circumstances involving independent contractors. It instead
used the Restatement to formulate a "common-law test for
160 Reid, 490 US at 741, citing Holyfield, 490 US at 43.
16' Reid, 490 US at 740 (1989).
162 Id.
1s See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958). See also Reid, 490 US at
751.
164 Darden, 503 US at 325.
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determining who qualifies as an 'employee' under ERISA"
generally. 165
In Clackamas, the Supreme Court again used sections from
the Restatement (Second) of Agency to shape its analysis. The
Court cited to Section 2(2) defining "servant" as someone whose
work is "controlled or is subject to the right to control by the
master" and Section 220(1), stating that a servant is "a person
employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to control." 166
From these sections of the Restatement, the Court concluded
that "the common-law element of control is the principal
guidepost that should be followed." 167
B. The Restatement of Agency's Treatment of Volunteers
The minority circuits' approach is consistent with the
Restatement of Agency. As discussed earlier in this Comment,
the existence of a master-servant relationship signifies the
existence of an employer-employee relationship for the purposes
of Title VII. 168 Section 225 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency clearly states, "One who volunteers services without an
agreement for or expectation of reward may be a servant of the
one accepting such services." 169 This means that the lack of
remuneration does not control the presence of a master-servant
relationship, which in turn means that remuneration is not a
threshold for finding an employer-employee relationship.
Other sections of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
support the idea that the definition of "servant" is broad. In
describing the difference between servants and non-servants, a
comment in Section 2 of the Restatement states that "there are
many factors which are considered by the courts in defining the
relation" and does not mention remuneration or compensation
as distinguishing characteristics. 170 A comment in Section 220
adds:
16 Id at 323.
166 Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 2(2), 220(1) (1958). See also Clackamas, 538
US at 448.
167 Clackamas, 583 US at 448.
16s See Part I.B.
169 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 225 (1958).
170 Id § 2 (1958).
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The relation of master and servant is indicated by the
following factors: an agreement for close supervision of
the servant's work; work which does not require the
services of one highly educated or skills; the supplying of
tools by the employer; payment by hour or month;
employment over a consideration period of time with
regular hours; full time employment by one employer;
employment in a specific area or over a fixed route; the
fact that the work is part of the regular business of the
employer; the fact that the community regards those
doing such work as servants; the belief by the parties
that there is a master and servant relation; an agreement
that the work cannot be delegated. 171
Again, while remuneration is relevant, there is no
indication that remuneration is required for the existence of a
master-servant relationship, and consequently an employer-
employee relationship.
The most recent Restatement (Third) of Agency does not
alter the expansive definition of "servant" in the Restatement
(Second) of Agency. 172 While it does not explicitly restate that
unpaid volunteers can still be considered "servants," it does not
override Section 225 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
Also, within the section describing a principal's liability to an
employee acting within scope of his or her employment, the
Restatement says that "the fact that work is performed
gratuitously does not relieve a principal of liability."173 It then
restates the factors from the Restatement (Second) of Agency
that were relied upon in Reid in determining "employee"
status. 174
171 Id § 220 (1958).
172 See generally Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006).
17s Id § 7.07(3)(b) (2006).
174 Id § 7.07 Comment f (2006) (relevant factors include "the extent of control that
the agent and the principal have agreed the principal may exercise over details of the
work; whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; whether the
type of work done by the agent is customarily done under a principal's direction or
without supervision; the skill required in the agent's occupation; whether the agent or
the principal supplies the tools and other instrumentalities required for the work and
the place in which to perform it; the length of time during which the agent is engaged by
a principal; whether the agent is paid by the job or by the time worked; whether the
agent's work is a part of the principal's regular business; whether the principal and the
agent believe that they are creating an employment relationship; and whether the
principal is or is not in business. Also relevant is the extent of control that the principal
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C. Consistency with the Restatement of Agency and the
Common Law Agency Test
Since the Supreme Court relied on one part of the
Restatement of Agency's master-servant explanation, it follows
that other clearly applicable parts of the Restatement would
help determine how to evaluate the "employee" status of
volunteers. Therefore, Section 225 of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency's statement, that individuals who volunteer without
reward can be servants, supports the minority circuits' common
law agency test and refutes the majority circuits' threshold
remuneration test.
One issue with the reliance on supplementary sections of
the Restatement of Agency is that the EEOC appears to favor
the majority circuits' threshold remuneration approach.
Regarding the treatment of volunteers under Title VII, the
EEOC's Compliance Manual states:
Volunteers usually are not protected "employees."
However, an individual may be considered an employee
of a particular entity if, as a result of volunteer service,
[he or she] receives benefits such as a pension, group life
insurance, workers' compensation, and access to
professional certification, even if the benefits are
provided by a third party. The benefits constitute
"significant remuneration" rather than merely the
"inconsequential incidents of an otherwise gratuitous
relationship."1 7 5
This language suggests that the EEOC endorses the
threshold-remuneration test, particularly because it quotes
Haavistola, a majority circuit case. 176
As discussed earlier in this Comment, the Supreme Court in
Clackamas described the EEOC as "the agency that has special
enforcement responsibilities under . . . federal statutes
containing similar threshold issues for determining coverage."1 77
It also adopted the EEOC's control-focused factors relevant to
has exercised in practice over the details of the agent's work").
17' Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-
111(c), Covered Parties, 2009 WL 2966755 (2009), citing Haavistola, 6 F3d at 222.
176 See Part II.A.4.
177 Clackamas, 538 US at 448 (2003).
605] 29
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
whether a shareholder-director is an "employee." 178 Nonetheless,
the Court referred to the EEOC only after it determined control
was an important element in the Restatement of Agency's
definitions of master and servant. 179
Additionally, the most recent Supreme Court case that
defined terms under Title VII, Vance v Ball State University,180
suggests that the Restatement of Agency is a more influential
source of authority than the EEOC. In Vance, the Court
analyzed two possible standards for determining whether an
employee is a "supervisor" for purposes of vicarious liability
under Title VII. 181 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent,
favored the EEOC's standard because it "reflects the agency's
informed judgment and body of experience in enforcing Title
VII." 182 However, the plurality, written by Justice Alito, rejected
the standard advocated by the EEOC, labeling it a "nebulous
definition." 183 The plurality instead turned to the Restatement of
Agency. In defining "supervisor," it "looked to the Restatement
of Agency for guidance."1 84
D. Broader Protection Provided by the Common Law Agency
Test
Volunteers are too valued in our society to leave them
unprotected from discrimination at their places of service.
Currently, there are other possible avenues of relief available to
volunteers outside of employment law, such as state defamation
law, whistleblower statutes, the First Amendment, statutes that
outlaw discrimination in places of public accommodation, and
tort against individual or company. 185 However, volunteers need
178 Id at 449-50.
179 Id at 448-50.
180 133 S Ct 2434 (2013).
181 Id at 2443 (deciding whether "supervisors" were only those employees who have
the power to take tangible employment actions against the victim or whether the term
could also include those who have the ability to exercise significant direction over the
victim's daily work).
182 Id at 2461-62 (Ginsburg dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasizing
that the EEOC had paid close attention to the relevant case law and doctrinal
framework in developing its definition for supervisor).
1ss Id at 2443 (stating that the approach recommended by the EEOC would make the
determination of supervisor status depend on a highly case-specific evaluation of
numerous factors).
184 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2441.
183 See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected
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not turn to these avenues if Title VII extends to them. The
minority circuits' common law agency test allows for broader
Title VII protections because it does not require plaintiff
volunteers to overcome an initial hurdle of proving receipt of
remuneration. 186
A recent district court case outlines the issue succinctly: "A
workplace is not necessarily any different for a non-compensated
volunteer than it is for a compensated 'employee,' and while both
are generally free to quit if they don't like the conditions .
neither should have to quit to avoid sexual, racial, or other
unlawful discrimination and harassment."1 8 7 The minority
circuits' common law agency test accounts for negligible
differences between paid employees and unpaid volunteers by
looking cumulatively at factors relevant to an employment
relationship. In contrast, the majority circuits' threshold-
remuneration test closes off Title VII protections from a class of
volunteers who do not receive any financial benefits, but may
have a relationship with their host organization that resembles
an employee-employer relationship in other ways.18 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The minority circuits' common law agency test should be
used to decide whether a volunteer qualifies as an "employee"
entitled to Title VII protection. Unlike the majority circuits'
threshold-remuneration test, the common law agency test is
consistent with both the Restatement of Agency and relevant
Supreme Court precedent.189 Additionally, the common law
agency test allows for Title VII to extend to volunteers who have
a functional employee-employer relationship with their
organization, regardless of whether they receive
remuneration. 190 Volunteers are valued by their organizations,
their communities, and American society generally, so a test for
plaintiff volunteers that is supported by significant sources of
authority and provides broader Title VII protection is the best
option.
Volunteers, 9 U Pa J Lab & Emp L 147, 183-84 (2006).
1s6 See, for example, Bryson, 656 F3d at 354.
187 Volling, 2012 WL 6021553 at *10.
188 See, for example, O'Connor, 126 F3d at 115.
189 See Part III.A-C.
190 See Part 1IID.
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